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1. Introduction 
Fiscal policy and monetary policy are the two cornerstones of macroeconomic policy, aimed at 
creating macroeconomic stability and economic growth. While both policies have common ob-
jectives, the instruments used differ. Fiscal policy relies upon instruments such as government 
expenditure, taxes and borrowing. Monetary policy influences the level of economic activity 
through actions that influence the overall liquidity in the economy. Effective macroeconomic 
management presupposes a coordinated fiscal and monetary policy framework with a clear di-
vision of responsibilities and instruments, since fiscal policy has a strong impact on the conduct 
of monetary policy. The objectives of the fiscal authority can only be achieved by the use of 
fiscal instruments, without subordinating monetary policy to fiscal objectives. The monetary 
financing of a high fiscal deficit and government borrowing at below market-determined inter-
est rates significantly affect the effective functioning of monetary policy and lead ultimately to 
the build-up of inflationary pressure in the economy. Conversely, when fiscal policy is sustain-
able and financed in a non-inflationary way, monetary policy can be conducted to deliver a 
stable price level and a reduction in output fluctuations. 
Since the activities of the fiscal authority can thus place constraints on the effectiveness of 
monetary policy, this paper reviews some institutional arrangements that provide the central 
bank with a substantial degree of freedom to formulate and implement monetary policy in 
pursuit of its policy target(s), i.e. instrument independence. 
In order to ensure a coordinated and consistent policy framework by the respective authorities, 
several concrete fiscal/monetary policy interfaces have to be addressed. These relate to: 
1. Direct credit to the government 
2. Indirect credit to the government 
3. Quasi-fiscal activities of the central bank 
4. Exchange rate regime. 
2. Direct credit to the government 
It is a widely accepted consensus that the best possible way monetary policy can contribute to 
the growth of employment and economic activity is through the pursuit of a stable price level. 
However, in conducting monetary policy effectively towards this final objective, central banks 
in many transition countries were repeatedly subordinated to fiscal financing decisions in the 
past, leaving little room for an effective stabilisation policy. This is evident in past episodes of 
chronic inflation and an extreme volatility of output. 
Because both monetary and fiscal policies are intrinsically linked through the budget constraint 
of the government, a sound monetary policy, and hence a country’s inflation performance, are 
dependent on the stance of its fiscal policy. The government can finance a budget deficit either 
by increasing foreign or domestic debt, or by monetary deficit financing by the central bank. 
When the deficit is financed by direct central bank credit (e.g. central bank loans or central 
bank purchases of government debt in form of bonds), it results in increasing the monetary 
base (reserve money) and a proportional increase in broad money (given a constant money 
multiplier). In order to study the potential harmful effects of such deficit financing, a distinction 
should be made according to the time horizon of such direct central bank credit, i.e. whether it 
is granted on a permanent or a temporary basis. 
Permanent credit to the government 
Since this procedure significantly reduces the ability of the central bank to conduct independ-
ent monetary policy, many industrial countries have legally prohibited or at least severely lim-
ited direct central bank credit to the government on a permanent basis to avoid a potential 
loss of monetary control. In emerging market economies (in particular countries in transition), 
direct lending to the government continued to be more widespread. Narrow and underdevel-
oped domestic financial markets and limited access to external financing inevitably lead to 
monetary deficit financing, at least at the initial stage of the transformation process. However, 
an open-ended access to credit facilities at the central bank no longer exists: in the major 
emerging market economies limits are imposed on the amount, maturity, purpose or frequency 
of recourse to central bank credit either by the respective central bank legislation or by the na-
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tional constitution (see the second and third column of Table A in the Annex; further evidence 
is presented by BIS [1999] and JACOME H. [2001]). 
There can be cases, e.g. when state-owned commercial banks are involved, where the above 
mentioned prohibition of granting credit to the government can be by-passed. If such banks 
provide credit to the government while simultaneously obtaining reserves from the central 
bank, the control of the development of the monetary base loosens. Therefore, judged by its 
similar effects on the operational independence of the central bank, such cases of credit to the 
government via the banking system should be treated the same way as direct credit to the 
government and prohibited or at least strictly limited. 
As far as the monetary consequences of fiscal deficit financing are concerned, no distinction 
between central bank credit in form of bonds or loans (i.e. marketable or non-marketable 
debt) is normally made. However, differences between these forms do exist. It is regarded less 
harmful if credit is granted through the acquisition of bonds since it provides the central bank 
with a stock of government bonds, increasing thereby the flexibility of the implementation of 
monetary policy. 
Temporary credit to the government 
An exception from the legal prohibition of direct central bank credit to the government is in 
reality frequently found with the provision of short-term loans to the government which are 
exclusively devoted to the purpose of bridging temporary mismatches in receipts and pay-
ments in the budget. However, the granting of such liquidity loans to the government for 
bridging short-term liquidity difficulties should follow strict conditions regarding the nature, 
maximum amount, and time horizon of such financing. Table 1 provides an overview of such 
institutional features for 5 Central and Eastern European countries (see also the first column of 
Table A in the Annex for further evidence). 
Since a credible facility with the above mentioned institutional features is only a mechanism to 
cover day-to-day mismatches in receipts and payments of the government, it must not be re-
garded as a permanent source of financing for the budget deficit. Such problems could only 
arise when this short-term credit to the central government turns into a practice of rolling over 
this facility, again resulting in automatic monetisation of the government’s deficit. Therefore, 
the use of such a facility will have to be periodically suspended. Furthermore, it is important to 
charge a market-related interest rate on any balances outstanding. 
Table 1. Limits to direct credit to government 
in 5 Central and Eastern European Countries 
 Czech Republic Hungary Poland Slovakia Slovenia 
Direct 
credit 
• Purchase of 
short-term (3 
month) Treasury 
bills permitted 
• Maximum: 5% 
of previous 
year’s state 
budget revenues 
• Short-term li-
quidity loans to 
bridge tempo-
rary difficulties 
permitted 
• Maximum: 2% 
of planned 
budget reve-
nues 
• Purchase of 
government 
securities on 
the primary 
market permit-
ted 
• Maximum: 2% 
of the planned 
state budget 
expenditures 
• Purchase of short-
term (3 month) 
Treasury bills to 
cover fluctuations 
in the state 
budget permitted 
• Maximum: 5% of 
state budget reve-
nue of previous 
year 
• Short-term loans to 
bridge temporary 
imbalances in the 
budget permitted 
• Maximum: 5% of 
budget of current 
year and not more 
than 20% of antici-
pated budget deficit  
Source: RADZYNER AND RIESINGER [1997], p.69 
Proposal 1: Due to its inflationary consequences, direct credit to the government 
should be legally prohibited or at least severely limited. The design of (temporary) 
liquidity loans has to obey strict constraints which ensure the credible use of such an 
instrument. 
3. Indirect credit to the government 
Contrary to the acquisition of government securities in the primary market, the acquisition of 
such securities by the central bank on the secondary market, where government debt trades 
along with private sector securities at market-determined interest rates (indirect credit to the 
government)– is permitted by the majority of advanced countries central banks. However, 
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most of theses countries established safeguard clauses which limit this kind of transaction to 
operations conducted for monetary policy purposes. The following Table 2 gives an overview 
for 5 Central and Eastern European Countries (for further evidence on selected emerging mar-
kets, see the last column of Table A in the Annex). 
Table 2. Limits to indirect credit to government 
in 5 Central and Eastern European Countries 
 Czech Republic Hungary Poland Slovakia Slovenia 
Indirect 
credit 
• In order to regu-
late the money 
market the bank 
can buy and sell 
negotiable secu-
rities 
• The bank enters 
into security 
transactions with 
repurchase 
agreements 
• No provisions 
concerning the 
secondary 
market 
• Bank may pur-
chase and sell ne-
gotiable securities 
for the purpose of 
regulating the 
money market  
• The bank regulates 
the amount of 
money by purchasing 
and selling state se-
curities 
Source: RADZYNER AND RIESINGER [1997], p.69 
The three main types of monetary policy instruments used by most central banks are open 
market transactions (in the form of outright purchases/sales of bonds and repo operations), 
standing credit facilities (e.g. discount and lombard facilities), and reserve requirements. Broad 
use of open market transactions, both in the form of outright or repo operations, is greatly fa-
cilitated by the presence of developed markets for high-quality, liquid debt securities. Often, 
this involves short-term paper issued by the central government (usually Treasury bills) with 
no credit risk. However, there are cases where central banks have issued substantial amounts 
of their own securities (see HAWKINS [2004] for a detailed overview). This took place in situa-
tions where government securities where not available or not suitable for this purpose, e.g. 
due to an underdeveloped market in government papers. The crucial advantage of using only 
its own securities for monetary policy purposes is that by not needing to hold government se-
curities the central bank may avoid the temptation of (indirectly) lending to the government, 
thereby increasing its independence from the fiscal authority. This can further clarify the dis-
tinction between monetary and fiscal management functions (HAWKINS [2004], p. 7). 
Proposal 2: Purchases of government bonds in the secondary markets for the sole 
purpose of conducting monetary policy are generally permitted. However, using cen-
tral bank securities for this purpose could be preferable, since this shields the central 
bank from indirect lending to the government completely. 
4. Quasi-fiscal activities of the central bank 
It was stated in the first section, that in many countries central bank laws emphasize the op-
erational independence of the central bank and prohibit or restrict its direct financing of the 
fiscal deficit. 
In some countries, however, in order to ease budget pressures, a number of activities carried 
out by central banks are quasi-fiscal in nature. These activities may potentially threaten the 
proper conduct of monetary policy, which is the primary responsibility of the central bank. In 
general, quasi-fiscal activities (QFA henceforth) may be conducted by the central bank, public 
financial institutions, and nonfinancial public enterprises. This is a particularly frequent phe-
nomenon in transition countries, where officially recorded budget accounts do not necessarily 
reflect the overall public sector balance. Such operations may be used by governments as a 
substitute for direct fiscal measures, and will have similar economic effects in whichever part 
of the public sector they are conducted (IMF [2001], p.13). It is difficult to precisely identify 
and quantify QFA by central banks, but they may involve operations related to the manage-
ment of the financial system (e.g., subsidized lending at below market-rates and directed 
credit) or the exchange system (e.g., multiple exchange rates and import deposits). Typically, 
subsidized lending to financial institutions or enterprises is extended at the request of the gov-
ernment or parliament. The difference between the interest rates on such loans and the pre-
vailing market-rates is essentially a subsidy, i.e. a QFA by the central bank. Table 3 presents a 
listing of different types of QFA. 
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Table 3. Types of quasi-fiscal activity 
 
Source: IMF [2001], p.29 
Apart from the general negative evaluation of QFA that tend to cause distortions in financial 
markets, thereby leading to a misallocation of resources, the involvement of the central bank 
in such activities poses some further threats for macroeconomic stability. The government’s 
call on the central bank to undertake a variety of QFA exposes the central bank to an increase 
in the probability of negative cash-flows from these operations jeopardizing monetary policy 
designed to maintain price stability. Under such circumstances, the ability of the central bank 
to meet its monetary objectives will depend on its ability to maintain an adequate amount of 
capital to deal with possible losses, or to avoid involvement in potentially costly quasi-fiscal 
activities, or both. 
Proposal 3: Central banks should not handle quasi-fiscal activities which deteriorate 
their financial position, leading to a loss of control over monetary policy instruments. 
The government must ensure at any time the central bank’s capital integrity in order 
to support policy independence. 
5. Exchange rate regime 
The previous sections reviewed certain institutional arrangements for the implementation of 
monetary policy that attempt to insulate the monetary authority from financing requirements 
of the fiscal authority. While these arrangements are absolutely necessary for the conduct of 
an independent monetary policy, they are not sufficient. Of particular importance in this re-
spect is the choice of the exchange rate regime, which has a considerable impact on the de-
gree of autonomy in the use of monetary policy instruments. 
In practice, most governments (in some cases jointly with the central bank) determine the ex-
change rate regime. In case of a fixed rate regime (in its different versions), the central bank 
is normally required to defend the parity by means of intervention in the foreign exchange 
market. This has implications for the quantity of the monetary base, which in the case of non-
sterilised interventions moves one-by-one with movements in net foreign assets. Central banks 
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regularly try to shield the monetary base from these movements by sterilising their interven-
tions, leaving the monetary base unchanged, but this procedure can reach its limits. The point 
here to note is that the chosen exchange rate regime can affect the independent operation of 
monetary policy matters. For example, the government may set an exchange rate target (or 
band) which is inconsistent with economic fundamentals and the monetary policy settings re-
quired to meet the policy objectives of the central bank. A likely result of such a policy is that 
the central bank suffers large losses following massive intervention in the foreign exchange 
market in case the parity cannot be defended. 
Proposal 4: Given the close link between exchange rate and monetary policy, con-
flicts can arise between defending an exchange rate target and domestic monetary 
policy objectives. In such a case of policy conflicts, priority should be given to the 
central bank to pursue its own monetary policy objectives. 
 
R.K. 
Berlin, July 2004 
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Annex 
Table A: Government funding by central banks 
 
 Source: BIS [2003], p.79 
Liquidity Loans Direct Loans
Purchase of 
bonds in pri-
mary market 
Purchase of 
bonds in secon-
dary market 
